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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past decade industrial organization economists and scholars of business 
organization have come to recognize more clearly than before the often very great differences 
among competing firms in the capabilities they have to do various things, and the central role 
these capability differences play in determining the winners and losers in industrial 
competition. A number of scholars writing and teaching in the field of business strategy have 
argued that a central aspect of a firm’s thinking about strategy ought to be the kinds of 
capabilities it needs in order to succeed in competition, and effective ways to develop or 
acquire those capabilities. Increasingly it is being recognized and argued that they key 
capabilities in question often are dynamic capabilities, capabilities that enable a firm to 
continue to innovate effectively and to take advantage of its continuing innovation. 
 
This view of relevant firm capabilities, and the appropriate focus of strategic thinking 
in firms, clearly does not apply to firms in all industries. But it does seem right for firms in 
industries where innovation is a central aspect of competition. This view of competition, of 
course, is «Schumpeterian». And industrial organization economists increasingly have come 
to recognize that Schumpeter’s theory of what competition is all about is  much more 
appropriate than neoclassical views of competition in a wide range of industries, where R`and 
D spending is significant. 
 
They also have come to recognize that in such industries the phenomena of first mover 
advantage, or dynamic increasing returns more generally, may be very important. Firms that 
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initially get a lead may be able to push off from that early lead to establish a position that is 
close to unchallengeable. Dynamic increasing returns may exist on the «supply side», as firms 
that get an early lead in product design and a large early share of the market can use their 
revenues to invest in more R and D than their competitors, and increase the advantages that 
their products hold over those of competitors. There also may be dynamic increasing returns 
on the demand side, if old customers tend to return to their original suppliers for their next 
purchases, or if their are bandwagon effects. Under these conditions, competitive process may 
relatively quickly destroy competitive industry structure. This problem of course, raises some 
major issues of public policy in the field of anti trust, and in other areas.  
 
           In this paper, we explore some problems that industrial policy faces in industries 
characterized by dynamic increasing returns on the basis of a ”history-friendly model” of the 
evolution of the computer industry.  
 
The «history friendly» models 1 we are developing are  models that attempt to 
formalize the verbal appreciative theories about the major factors explaining the particular 
pattern of evolution of an industry or technology put forth by empirical scholars of that 
industry. Thus these models tend to incorporate more industry specific details than is 
customary of models built by economists.. Since the logic of  many verbal explanations for 
particular patterns of industry and technology evolution, or coevolution,  involves non linear 
dynamics, our history friendly models take the form of simulation models.  
 
 
1 These models are in the tradition of  evolutionary models (Nelson-Winter,1982; Nelson,1995). 
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But while the early models we are building are tailored to particular industries,  we are 
interested as well in generalizations that can be made that cut across industries, and in 
identifying key clusters of structural variables that seem naturally to group industries. Thus our 
research program is very much in the spirit of traditional Industrial Organization. And while to 
date our focus has been largely on trying to understand observed patterns, we also are very 
much interested in what these models can tell us about the efficacy of economic policies. 
 
Our first history friendly models have been of the evolution of the computer industry 
and computer technology. Here, virtually  all appreciative theoretic accounts have highlighted 
dynamic increasing returns of one form or another. While different authors have placed the 
emphasis in different places, our own analysis, which was sharpened greatly by our building 
and running a formal model, shows clearly that at least two different kinds of dynamic 
increasing returns play key roles in the history of the industry. One is increasing returns in a 
firm’s efforts to advance its product and process technologies. Firms that are initially 
successful learn from their past successes and, because technological success generally leads 
to greater sales and profits, have the funds to further expand their R and D. efforts.  The other 
is increasing returns on the marketing side. For a variety of reasons, customers who buy a 
particular brand of computer one time tend, other things equal, to buy that same brand when 
they expand their capacity or replace their old equipment. However, this latter tendency was 
much stronger in the era of mainframe computers than in the era of personal computers, to 
anticipate the history that we will recount briefly in Section 2.  
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The result of these dynamic forces was, of course, the rise of IBM as a near 
monopolist in mainframes. On the other hand, IBM was not able to transfer its monopoly 
position to personal computers. Our simulation models suggest that, given the structure of 
dynamic increasing returns, this pattern was nearly inevitable (although the way IBM entered 
the PC market certainly militated against its achieving a durable market dominating position 
there).  If  IBM had not reached dominance in mainframes, some other firm would. The 
interactive operation of those two different kinds of dynamic increasing returns virtually 
guaranteed that a dominant firm would emerge. And that dominant firm would have had 
trouble extending its monopoly into PCs because the absence there of a strong customer lock 
in effect.  
       
       Could public policies have changed these patterns? This is the question we explore in this 
paper. We do not address directly issues related to the desirability of industrial policy, Rather, 
we explore the efficacy  problems that policy faces in dynamic environments. How does 
policy affect industry structure over the course of industry evolution? Is the timing of the 
intervention important? Do policy interventions have indirect and perhaps unintended 
consequences on different markets at different times?  
  
     We focus on three sets of policies: antitrust, interventions aiming at supporting the entry of 
new firms in the industry and public procurement of totally new products.  The reasons for 
examining antitrust are straightforward.  It is commonly considered to be the main instrument 
to curb monopoly power and   in the history of the computer industry  the discussion on  the 
actions of antitrust authorities figure prominently.  
  
 
6
 
  
     The focus on interventions favoring the entry of new firms stems from the recognition of 
the crucial role of entrants in spurring competition, in opening up new markets and in 
generating new technologies.  Lack of  new entrants is often considered to be one of the 
possible explanations of the failure of the European industry to compete successfully with the 
USA in the computer industry as well as in other high technology industries.   More generally,  
policies supporting entry have become one the favored tools of industrial policies in Europe, 
both for promoting industrial growth and for raising market contestability.  
 
 Finally,  in the history of high technology industries, public procurement in favor of firms 
developing totally new products (particularly in the United States) has been quite relevant in 
fostering high rates of technical change. 
 
     However, it is a legitimate question to ask  whether and to what extent such policies can be 
successful in industries characterized by dynamic increasing returns, especially if the dynamic 
returns are generated by multiple sources. Are either antitrust or the promotion of entry 
sufficient to contrast the emergence of a monopoly? How big should the interventions be and 
at what time should they act?     To anticipate some of our results, if  strong dynamic 
increasing returns are operative,  both through technological capabilities  and through 
customer tendency to stick with a brand, the results of our simulations show that there  is little 
that anti-trust and entry policy could have done to avert the rise of a dominant firm in 
mainframes. On the other hand,  public procurement played a role in affecting market structure 
and concentration.  However, if the customer lock in effect had been smaller, either by chance 
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or through policies that discouraged efforts of firms to lock in their customers, the situation 
concerning antitrust and entry support might have been somewhat different. In the first place,  
even in the absence of anti trust or entry encouraging policies, market concentration would 
have been lower, albeit a dominant firm would emerge anyhow. Second, anti trust and entry 
encouraging polices would have been more effective in assuring that concentration would 
decrease. The leading firm would continue to dominate the market, but its relative power 
would be reduced.  
 
     The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly discuss the history of the 
computer industry. In section 3 we present the model. In section 4 we discuss history 
replicating simulations, while in section 5 we compare the effects of alternative – extremely 
stylized – policy interventions. In section 6 we draw some final conclusions.  
 
 
 
2. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY AND COMPETITION 
POLICY
 
 Given space constraints, we can recount only a stylized history of computer technology 
and the computer industry,  drawing  from  Flamm (1988), Langlois (1990), Bresnahan and 
Greenstein (1999), and especially Bresnahan and Malerba (1999).   
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     The history of the computer shows continuous improvements in machines that serve 
particular groups of users, punctuated from time to time by the introduction of significant new 
component technologies which not only permit the needs of existing users to be met better, but 
also open up the possibility of designing machines that serve new classes of users whose needs 
could not be met using older technology.  In the United States these punctuations were 
associated with the entry into the industry of new firms, and these new firms almost always 
were the first to venture into the new market.  However, this happened to a significant lesser 
degree in Europe, and hardly at all in Japan. 
      
      The evolution of the industry divides rather naturally into four periods.  The first began 
with the early experimentation with computers which culminated in designs sufficiently 
attractive to induce their purchase by large firms with massive computation tasks, as well as 
by scientific laboratories.  This opened the era of the mainframe computer. The second era 
began with the introduction of integrated circuits and the development of minicomputers.  The 
third era is that of the personal computer, made possible by the invention of the 
microprocessor.  We now are in the era of networked PCs and the increasing use of the 
Internet.  
  
     During World War II and the years just after, Governments in several countries funded a 
number of projects with the aim of developing computers useful for Governmental purposes.  
In the late 1940's and early 1950's a number of companies, in Europe as well as in the United 
States, began investing their own funds hoping to develop a computer sufficiently attractive to 
win the market of scientific laboratories, large firms, and other organizations who had large-
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scale computation needs.  The early 1950's saw the entry into the industry of IBM--then a 
major punched-card and tabulating machinery company, but with significant capabilities in 
electronic computing derived in good part from government R and D contracts--and the rest of 
the Bunch (Burrows, Univac Rand, NCR, Control Data, Honeywell), as well as GE and RCA.                        
These companies differed in the strategies they took, and in their success in developing 
machines that would sell at a profit.  By 1954, with the introduction of the 650, IBM began to 
pull ahead of the Bunch, and with the introduction of the 1401 in 1960, came to dominate the 
world market for accounting machines. 
      
     IBM dominated not only in the American market, but in Europe, and Japan.  A small-scale 
domestic industry was able to hold on in Europe, and later in Japan, only by virtue of a 
combination of government subsidy, a guaranteed government market, and protection. 
 
    Component technology improved greatly during the the mainframe era, and transistors 
gradually  replaced vacuum tubes as the basic circuit elements. These developments enabled 
significant improvements in mainframe performance, and some reduction in cost.  In the early 
1960's IBM introduced its 360 family of models, and seized an even larger share of the 
mainframe market. 
 
 The invention and development of the integrated circuit enabled even further 
improvements in mainframe computers and also reduced barriers to entry in the mainframe 
industry, thus stimulating the entry of new competitors to IBM. However, integrated circuits 
not only permitted large computers to be made even more powerful.  They opened the 
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possibility of designing computers that had a considerable amount of power, but could be 
produced at a much lower cost than mainframes. DEC's PDP8, the first minicomputer, was 
produced in 1965.  Minicomputers opened up a new demand class which had not been tapped 
by mainframes, which included medium-sized research laboratories, manufacturing firms, and 
some small businesses. 
 
 In the United States new firms, like DEC were the first into the new minicomputer market; 
these new firms seized and held a significant share of that market.  IBM lagged in getting into 
minicomputers, and never achieved there the dominance it achieved in the mainframe market.  
While the availability of integrated circuits provided an opportunity for European and 
Japanese firms to get into the minicomputer market, as in the earlier case with mainframes, 
firms in Europe and Japan lagged.  American firms took a considerable fraction of the 
minicomputer market in Europe and Japan, and domestic firms held on there only through a 
combination of subsidy, and protection. 
 
 The introduction of the microprocessor marked another punctuation in the history of the 
industry.  Microprocessors enabled significant improvements in mainframe and minicomputer 
designs.  However, their most important impact was to permit the design of reasonably 
powerful computers that could be produced at quite low costs.  Personal computers opened up 
a new demand class which had not been touched by mainframes and minicomputers:  small 
firms, and personal users. 
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 As in the case of minicomputers, in the United States new firms entered the industry 
aiming to serve the new personal computer (PC) market:  these included prominently 
specialized PC design and manufacturing firms (such as Apple, Commodore, Tandy, and 
Compaq).  Established mainframe and minicomputer producers were slow in seeing the new 
market and the needs of users in that market.  Interestingly, when IBM did get into PCs, it did 
so with external alliances:  Microsoft for operating systems software, and Intel for 
microprocessors.  IBM did manage to seize a significant fraction of the personal computer 
market, but never was as dominant there as it had been in mainframes.  And, of course, in 
recent years IBM's share in PCs  has eroded significantly.   
 
 A striking characteristic of the firms producing personal computers is that they are 
primarily assemblers, buying most of their components on the open market.  Also, most of the 
software for personal computers is developed and supplied by software specialists.  This is in 
sharp contrast with mainframe production, particularly in the early and middle stages of the 
industry.  Thus IBM not only designed and produced most of the critical components for its 
mainframes, but also wrote most of the basic software.  For a time, IBM also designed and 
produced a significant fraction of the integrated circuits that were employed in its mainframes.  
In minicomputers there was, from the beginning, more vertical specialization than in 
mainframe production, with most minicomputer companies buying their integrated circuits, 
and a number of other key components, on the open market.  But personal computers have 
seen even more vertical disintegration.   
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 As noted, the advent of personal computers led, in the United States, to the birth of a 
number of new firms, several of which turned out to be very successful.  Just as in the case of 
minicomputers, in Europe and Japan in contrast few firms entered.  And, except where there 
was heavy government protection or subsidy, American firms have come to dominate foreign 
markets for personal computers. 
 
 There are many interesting challenges for history-friendly modeling in the history 
recounted above.  In a previous paper (Malerba-Nelson-Orsenigo-Winter,1999), we analyzed 
the pattern of development of industry structure. A second challenge is provided by the 
progressive vertical disintegration of the computer industry, and in particular by the sharp 
increase in specialization that has marked the era of personal computers.  Still a third challenge 
is to explain the significant differences between the United States on the one hand, and Europe 
and Japan on the other, with respect to the ability of new firms to take advantage of 
"competence destroying" technological changes. 
 
 In this paper we focus  on  a somewhat different issue. We discuss some problems  
concerning the conduct and the effects of alternative policy interventions which have or might 
have influenced the evolution of the computer industry.  The policy interventions that will be 
discussed in this paper concern antitrust and entry support. On the contrary we will not discuss 
military policy, which was quite relevant in the early history of the industry. As far as antitrust 
policies are concerned, during all the history of the industry they were anti-IBM both in the 
Unites States and Europe. In the United States antitrust policies forced IBM to unbundle 
mainframe  hardware from software and  to behave less aggressively with respect Amdahl and 
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PCMs. In Europe on the contrary they were highly tolerant of national champions in their anti 
IBM role. Entry support policies have been at the center of the policy debate, particularly in 
Europe, because  entry has played a major role in the history of the industry. This debate  has 
discussed how to foster entry in order to improve national competitiveness and, to a lesser 
extent, to  increase competition within concentrated segments such as mainframes. 
 
   Before discussing these policies, we are going to present the basic structure of the model. 
 
 
3. THE MODEL 
 
 In this section we lay out the basic model.  Given the nature of complex simulation 
models, it is impossible to present all the details of all the equations, without befuddling the 
reader and obscuring the basic logic of the model.  We have tried, therefore, to lay out in 
transparent form what we regard as the gist of the model.  Interested readers may obtain a full 
copy of the simulation model by writing to the authors.   
 
3.1 The Topography  
 
 In this model we consider a single stylized episode of the sort under consideration.  At the 
start of the episode, there is a single component technology, which we will call "transistor" 
technology, which has the promise of enabling useful computers.  Later, a new component 
technology, which we will call "microprocessors," comes into existence.  The potential 
purchasers of computers value two attributes.  One is the "performance" of the computer.  The 
other is its price, or "cheapness."  The desirability of any computer design can be summarized 
in terms of how it rates in those two dimensions of Lancaster attribute space. By a useful 
computer we mean one that meets threshold requirements of potential purchasers.  More on 
this shortly. 
 
 Each of the component technologies is associated with outer limits on what computers 
incorporating them can achieve in the two relevant dimensions.  For analytic convenience, we 
have treated those technological constraints as defining a rectangular box.  Thus in Figure I the 
two boxes depict the set of technological characteristics that potentially can be achieved in 
computers designed around transistor, and microprocessor, component technologies.  Note 
that the use of microprocessors permits computers to be designed that are better than 
transistor-based computers regarding both performance, and cheapness.  However, the most 
dramatic improvement that is permitted by the incorporation of microprocessors lies in the 
cheapness direction. 
Z Performance
Cheapness
TR
MP
Figure I
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 Those outer limits of what is feasible under the two technologies are "potentials."  The 
potential is not achievable, however, without significant investment of resources in research 
and development, and requires learning from experience. The first efforts of a new firm trying 
to design a computer using transistors, or (later) microprocessors, will only be able to achieve 
a design characterized by point Z (for zero experience).  We will specify the dynamics of 
design improvement built into the model in Section 3.2. 
 
 On the demand side, there are two quite separate groups of potential customers.  One 
group, which we will call "large firms"` greatly values "performance" and wants to buy 
"mainframes".  The second group, which we will call "individuals, or small users" has less 
need for high performance but values "cheapness".  They provide a potential market for 
"personal computers", or PCs. 
 
 Each of our two user groups requires a minimum level of performance, and cheapness, 
before they can be enticed to buy any computers at all.  Once threshold characteristics are 
reached, the value that customers place on a computer design is an increasing function of its 
performance, and its cheapness.  In Figure II we depict the preferences of "big firms" and 
"small users" respectively. The difference in the demands of the two user groups, that we 
specified above, is reflected in both the difference in threshold requirements, and in the 
indifference curves.  
Z Performance
Cheapness
Figure II
Big
Firms
Small
Users
 
 
 If one overlays Figure II on Figure I, one can note that even if computers achieve the outer 
limits permitted by transistor technology, the threshold requirements of small users will not be 
met.  Thus the design of computers that can successfully enter the personal computer market 
depends on the availability of microprocessors.   
 
 The "indifference curves" of Figure II depict designs of equal value or "merit" in the eyes 
of the two customer groups. We assume that higher computer merit translates into more 
computers bought by customers.  We shall develop the details in Section 3.3.    
 
 The above discussion indicates clearly some of the broad outlines of what one would 
expect to see in a simulated industry history, and also points to some of the matters that need 
to be treated in specification of the dynamics.  Assuming that there is some way that firms can 
obtain funds, computer technology will start out at Z.  Over time, and with R&D spending, 
computer designs will improve until ultimately they crack through the threshold requirements 
of the "mainframe market."  Then firms that have achieved threshold-meeting designs, will 
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begin to make sales.  As computers improve, sales will grow. The introduction of 
microprocessors will open the potential of meeting  mainframe demands even better, and of 
designing machines that will sell on the PC market.  Firms that try to pursue those possibilities 
will need some funding in order to do that because, initially at least, no one will buy their 
wares.  However, ultimately one would expect that microprocessor computers would take over 
the mainframe market, and be able to tap the new PC market. 
 
 We now turn to explicit dynamics. 
 
3.2 Innovation Dynamics, Firms’ Finance, R&D, Advertising and Pricicing Decisions 
 
 When transistors, and later microprocessors, come into existence, firms have to learn how 
to design effective computers using these new components.  Firms gradually develop 
competence in using the new technology as a result of the R&D investments they make, and 
the experience they accumulate.  Our model of firm learning is meant to capture significant 
elements of the "dynamic competence" theory of the firm that has been developed by Winter 
(1987), Dosi and Marengo (1993), and Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1992).  
 
 In the model, firms are represented by sets of technological and marketing 
competencies that are accumulated over time,  and by rules of action.  The focal competencies 
in the model are design capabilities:  by building incrementally on their past achievements and 
by accumulating experience, engineers produce successive generations of computers with 
superior cost/performance attributes. Other actions reflected in the model of the firm concern 
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the pricing of products, R&D and advertising expenditures, the adoption of new technologies 
and diversification into new markets.  There is no explicit representation of production per se, 
or of investments in capacity. It is assumed that the requisite production capabilities can be 
hired at a price per computer that reflects the "cheapness" attribute of the design.     
 
 Our model also is designed to incorporate the fact that in this industry, and in a number of 
others, a considerable period may go by after a firm starts trying to operate in a new 
technology before it is able to sell any product, if it ever achieves that.  At the start it must 
have external financing. 
 
 Thus at the beginning of our episode, with the introduction of transistors, we assume that 
there are a number of firms, endowed by "venture capitalists" with an initial budget to spend 
on R&D, who hope to exploit the new technological opportunities.  All firms start with the 
same initial design capabilities, depicted by Z in Figure 1, and perhaps interpretable as the 
design characteristics that have been achieved by experimental computers that are in the public 
domain.  Firms start off  with different, randomly selected initial budgets, IB, which are used 
to finance  an R&D project, the length of which is fixed and  equal for all firms. During this 
initial time, in each period firms spend a constant fraction of their budget on R&D. If the funds 
are exhausted before a marketable design is achieved, firms exit.2
 
 
2 Albeit different in basic concepts, structure and overall framework, this part of the model is similar to Jovanovic 
(1982) model. Firms start with an uncertain environment and only learn through experience –trial and error in the 
market- if this endowment is valuable or not. We are grateful to a referee for showing us this point. 
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  Design outcomes are influenced by firm-specific strategies represented by choices of 
search direction in the capabilities space, but also by latent technological opportunities. Firms 
are born with different, randomly selected trajectories of technological improvement along the 
two technological dimensions, costs and performance. In order to capture - in an extreme form 
- the notion that competencies cannot be changed rapidly and costlessly, in the model it is 
assumed that this trajectory is firm-specific and time-invariant. Thus, after the initial period, 
the firms in the industry will be doing different things, and will be achieving computer designs 
of different characteristics.  
 
 As firms spend on  R&D, they accumulate technical competencies. Technical progress 
is represented in the model as a change in a computer design along the two technical 
dimensions, generated by the application of these firm-specific competencies.  Technical 
competencies are represented as a stock that grows over time as a result of R&D expenditures.  
One can think of competencies as reflecting the shared experience of two types of “engineers”: 
cost-oriented and performance-oriented engineers. Their mix is defined by the technological 
trajectory that characterizes each firm. As time goes by, firms hire new engineers, maintaining 
constant at any period the proportion between the two types and hence the trajectory of 
advance.3  
 
 
3 As we will see later, the assumption that technical competencies grow over time is valid only within a given 
market and technology. With the emergence of a new technology or a new market, the accumulated competencies 
of existing firms decay in various ways. 
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 In each period t , R&D expenditures , Rt, are used to pay the stock of engineers of last 
period,  Rt-1.  For each of the two design dimensions, if the share of total R&D allocated to one 
particular type of engineers Rit > Rit-1, then the surplus is invested in hiring new engineers, at a 
given cost ceng  per engineer  Conversely, if Rit < Rit-1, then 10% of the engineeers is fired. If 
Rit < 0.9 Rit-1, the budget B is used to pay for the difference. 
 
 From period to period, the quality of the design that a company is able to achieve in each 
relevant dimension--performance and cheapness--improves according to the following 
equation:4
 
1)  change Xi = a0(Ri)a1(Tj)a2(Li-Xi)a3e 
 
 The first variable, R, is the firm's R&D expenditure aimed at achieving design 
improvements of a particular sort, where i=1 denotes performance and i=2 denotes cheapness.  
That expenditure allows the firm to maintain a given stock of engineers dedicated to 
advancing computer design in the two relevant dimensions.  That expenditure, in turn, is a 
constant fraction  of its period-by-period R&D expenditures in total.  The fraction reflects the 
firm's "bet" as to the most useful direction to proceed. As we noted, a firm's total R&D 
expenditure per period is a constant fraction of the total funds lent to it by its venture capital 
 
4 We use log linear equations whenever plausible because most economists have a good feel for their behavior 
and their quirks. Also, while in most cases the behavior being specified obviously relates to particular firms, to 
avoid clutter we do not denote that specifically. 
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financiers. After that initial loan is drawn down, a firm either has achieved a commercially 
viable design, or it is out of business. 
 
 The second variable, T, is the number of periods that the firm has been working with a 
particular technology, in this case transistors.  For all firms that start with a technology at the 
same time, this second variable will be the same.  However, when later in this exposition we 
begin to describe the evolution of computers employing microprocessor technology, firms will 
differ regarding the times when they get into that technology, and thus in that technology there 
will be differences across firms in this experience variable.   
 
 The third variable in the equation, Li-Xi, is distance of the achieved design to the frontier.  
As what is achieved comes closer and closer to the limits of what is achievable, a given R&D 
expenditure will achieve less and less further progress.  There also is a random element to 
what a firms achieves, e. 
 
 As indicated, if a firm runs through its initial loan before it achieves a marketable product, 
it simply fails.  However, if a firm manages to push its design into the region where customers 
are buying, it is a new ball game.  Now funds from revenues can be invested in R and D and in 
marketing. 
 
       Profits, π are calculated in each period t as: 
 
2) πt = M*p – M*k, 
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where M is the number of computers sold, p is the computer price and k is production cost of a 
single computer. 
 
Production costs, k, are determined by the technical progress function. Price is 
obtained by adding a mark-up, µ , to costs: 
 
3) p= k * (1+µ) 
 
 The mark-up, µ, is initially set equal for all firms , but it then grows over time as afunction 
of the market share that has been achieved. In other words, as firms gain monopoly power, 
they (partly) exploit it by charging prices above marginal costs. Specifically. 
 
4) µ = 0.1 + 0.1*m  
 
where  m is the firm’s market share. 
 
  The gross margin over production costs is used to cover several things.  Firms start to 
spend  a constant fraction σ (15% for all firms in this version of the model) of  their profits in  
each period  to pay back their debt Dt to investors -  that is to say, the initial budget capitalized 
at the current interest rate, r, until the debt has been fully paid back.. What is left is used to 
invest in R&D and in advertisising. 
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 R&D expenditures, Rt,  are simply determined as a constant fraction, φ , of what is left 
of gross profits, πt, after the repayment of the initial budget . 
 
5) Rt, =  φ * πt (1-  σ) 
 
 The variable φ is time-invariant and firm-specific, although in the simulations of this paper 
its value has been set equal for all firms. 
 
 Advertising expenditures are considered in a very similar way to R and D expenditures, in 
that they produce marketing competencies that are accumulated over time. If firms do not 
invest, their advertising capabilities deteriorate over time - and hence the size of the 
advertising expenditures effect decreases, for any given amount of expenditure. Moreover, it is 
assumed that the effect of advertising on sales follows a logistic curve. Specifically, the model 
first computes advertising expenditures, A*: 
 
6) A*t = δ * πt (1-  σ) 
 
 Then, this value is divided by a number that defines the amount of advertising 
expenditures beyond which the elasticity of sales to advertising is equal to zero (i.e. the 
asympote of the logistic curve).  This ratio is then inserted into a logistic curve to yield the 
value of the variable A in the demand equation (See equation 7, Section 3.3). 
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The excess gross profits after debt repayment, R&D expenditures and advertising is 
invested in an account,  Bt, that yields the interest rate, r, in each period. and is treated in this 
model as "reserves."  These reserves will enter the model in an important way for transistor 
firms who have survived into the era when microprocessors have become available as an 
alternative component technology.  We will consider what happens then in Sections 3.4 and 
3.5, concerned with transition dynamics. 
 
3.3 Market Dynamics 
  
      An essential feature of the computer market is the existence of differentiated products and 
different market segments. The model incorporates some of these features of the demand side 
of the industry. 
  
     The industry is composed of different types of users who have different needs regarding the 
characteristics of computers. Moreover, demand behaviour  is influenced by informational 
considerations and by the advertising efforts of producers, as well as by the  actual utility of 
alternatives presented. "Comparison shopping" is limited. Some customers may purchase 
computers that are far from the best on the market at the time, simply because, viewed in 
isolation, those computers are worth the asking price. Finally, bandwagon and brand loyalty 
effects may play an important role in determining the performance of individual firms. 
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First of all, the demand for computers is expressed as a demand for specific product 
characteristics in a Lancasterian vein.  Let p be the price charged for a specific computer, then 
denote "cheapness" by  X1 (= 1/p = 1/ k * (1+µ)), and "performance" by X2. 
   
     Computers are demanded by two different user groups, identified as "big firms" and 
"individuals."  They constitute, respectively, the mainframe market and the personal computer 
market. The choice of these two particular groups of users is due to the fact that mainframes 
have been mostly used by big firms, while personal computers have been sold for personal 
uses (at home or at work). These users differ in their threshold requirements for the attributes 
of cheapness and performance, with individuals having more stringent minimum requirements 
for cheapness but less stringent requirements for performance than do big firms. The market 
activity of each type is represented by independent purchasing decisions by a large number of 
"submarkets" of that type.  Submarket buying behavior reflects the fact that computers are 
durable goods that deliver services over a period of time, and the demand facing producers is a 
demand for replacements or increments to the stock of such durables. 
  
 The number of submarkets in each main market (mainframes and PCs) is a parameter of 
the model. Individual sub-markets buy computers if they don’t have one - either because they 
have never bought one before or because of breakdowns.  Computers have a finite life and 
surely break down after τ periods. The model keeps track of the average age, G, of the 
computers held by each submarket. In each period, a fraction G/τ of the submarkets 
experiences computer breakdowns and becomes ready to buy new computers. Moreover, 
submarkets buy computers if they “see” the supply: when there are only few firms in the 
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market, individual submarkets may not purchase any computers. The probability of buying a 
computer is equal to one if there are at least S firms selling in the marketplace. When there are 
only n<S firms, the probability decreases proportionally.   
  
     A simple formulation of consumer preferences is the  following. . Consider a particular 
group of consumers. Define M as the “level” of utility associated with a computer with 
particular attributes. Then, the utility of a computer with cheapness X1 = 1/p and performance 
X2 for the user class s is given by a Cobb-Douglas function with the arguments that measure 
the extent to which threshold requirements have been exceeded rather than the raw values of 
cheapness and performance themselves: 
 
(7)  M = b0 (X1 – X1min)b1 (X2-X2min)b2
 
where b0 is a scale parameter, and X1min and X2min are the threshold levels for cheapness and 
performance. If threshold requirements are not met, M=0.  The sum of the exponents in the 
utility function  operates like a sort of generalized demand elasticity reflecting performance as 
well as price.  
  
     Consider now some number of customer groups, say two. Let the  (integer) number of 
computers of a particular character that potentially would be purchased by a specific group of 
customers (if no other competing product were offered in the market) correspond to the level 
of utility, M. In other words, the greater the "merit" of a machine, the greater the number of 
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machines that will be purchased.  This way, the utility function has a cardinal interpretation 
and is treated heuristically as a demand curve. 
  
     After some time, some firms will succeed in achieving a computer design that satisfies the 
minimum thresholds required by consumers in the mainframe market and will start selling 
their product on the market. At the beginning, the market is small, both because the utility 
delivered by computers is low (the industry is in its infancy and technology has not yet 
progressed very much) and because many consumers may not even perceive that these 
products are available (or they may not even realize that computers might be useful to them). 
As the quality of computers increases and as more and more firms enter the market, total 
demand grows as a consequence of both an increase in the number of consumers and an 
increase in the number of computers purchased by individual groups of customers. 
  
     If there is more than one kind of computer that meets threshold requirements, our analysis 
of demand involves variables other than M.  The appreciative story put forth by many scholars 
of the history of the industry to account for the sustained dominance of IBM in the mainframe 
market includes concepts like band wagon effects or brand loyalty (or lock in), and 
advertising.  Thus history friendly modeling needs to bring these in.  
 
     Customers select different computer designs as a function of their relative utility, Mi, as it 
results from the specific mix of price and performance characteristics. However, various 
informational  constraints, like bandwagon and brand-loyalty effects,  affect customers 
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behavior. These are captured in a compact formulation by the effect of the variables measuring 
the firms’ market shares and advertising. 
  
     The probability, Pi,  that any submarket (individual computer buyer or group of them) will 
purchase a particular computer, i,  is as follows. 
 
8)  Pi = c0(Mi)c1(mi+d1)c2(Ai +d2)c3
 
 co is specified so that the sum of the probabilities adds to one. As noted, M denotes the 
"merit" of a computer. "m" is the market share, in terms of the fraction of total sales revenues 
accounted for by that computer.  Note that the market share variable can be interpreted either 
in terms of a bandwagon effect, or a (probabilistic) lock-in of customers who previously had 
bought machines of a particular brand.  The "d1" assures that computers that have just broken 
into the market, and have no prior sales, can attract some sales. "A" is the advertising 
expenditures of the firm producing the computer.  The "d2" performs here a similar role to  
"d1" for firms that have just broken into the market and have not yet invested in advertising. 
  
     Given that  customers in a particular submarket buy a particular computer, M is the number 
they buy. Note the following.  First, if there is only one computer that meets threshold 
requirements, each submarket will buy it with probability 1, and will buy "M" units of it, as we 
asserted (assumed) earlier.  Second, assume that there is more than one computer that passes 
the threshold.  If "c1" is very high, and "c2" and "c3" are very low, virtually all the customers 
will buy the computer with the highest merit score.  On the other hand, if "c1" is relatively 
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low, or "c2" and "c3" are high, a higher merit computer may be "out sold" by a rival computer 
that has the higher existing market share, or which has been advertised more intensively, or 
both. 
  
     In the absence of the bandwagon/brand loyalty effect and of advertising, the  demand 
module would behave similarly to a standard demand curve. Demand would converge to “best 
value for the money”, although in the limit a positive probability of survival for inferior 
computers always remains. Convergence is faster the higher is the parameter c1. The 
consideration of brand loyalty and of the bandwagon effect changes this picture quite 
drastically, introducing inertia and forms of increasing returns.  
 
3.4 Competition Between the Technologies, With "Locked In" Firms   
 Within this model, after a number of periods have gone by, and after a number of transistor 
firms have successfully entered the mainframe market, microprocessors come into existence.  
A number of new firms start out at point "Z" in Figure 1, with funding provided by venture 
capitalists, just as earlier new firms had started out at that point  using transistor technology.  
Some of these firms will fail before they get into a market.  Others may succeed. 
  
     Notice that while existing transistor firms provide no "barrier to entry" for microprocessor 
firms who have aimed their trajectory toward the personal computer, or PC, market, the 
existence of established transistor firms in the mainframe market creates a significant barrier 
to entry.  First of all, if a microprocessor firm achieves a design that meets threshold 
requirements in the mainframe market, that computer is in competition with existing 
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transistor-based computers that already have achieved higher than threshold quality levels.  
Second, the extant transistor mainframe producers have acquired positive market share, and 
have engaged in significant advertising, and that further disadvantages a newcomer.  It is an 
open question within this model whether a new microprocessor firm can survive in the 
mainframe market.  If not, and if extant transistor firms cannot or do not switch over to 
making mainframes out of microprocessors, the potential in the mainframe market afforded by 
microprocessor technology never will be realized. 
  
     In fact, we know that microprocessor firms did enter the mainframe market, but did not fare 
well there, in part because extant mainframe firms themselves adopted microprocessor 
technologies.  Further, some of those old mainframe firms, IBM in particular, then used 
microprocessor technology to try to enter the PC market.  Thus there are two different kinds of 
transitional dynamics that need to be built into this model, if it is to be "history friendly."  
First, we must enable firms that originally are using one technology to switch over to another.  
Second, we must enable firms who are in one market to try to diversify into the other. 
 
3.5 Transition Dynamics 
  
     We noted above our desire to capture in our model a number of aspects of the new 
understandings about dynamic firm competencies, and competence "lock-ins".  We have built 
into the model that firm competencies are "cumulative" with today's design efforts building on 
what was achieved yesterday.  Firms tend to get better and better at the particular things they 
are doing.  On the other hand, it is clear that firms often have a good deal of difficulty when 
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they try to do significantly new things.  Thus Tushman and Anderson (1986), and Henderson 
and Clark (1990), have documented the difficulty that firms often have in coping when the 
best technologies underlying their products change significantly.  Quite often extant firms 
cannot switch over rapidly enough to counter the efforts of new firms using the new 
technology.  Christensen and Rosenbloom  (1994) have put a spotlight on similar difficulties 
that extant firms have had in recognizing new markets when they opened up. 
  
     In our model, existing transistor based mainframe firms are able to switch over to 
microprocessor technology for use in their mainframe designs, but this may be time 
consuming and costly for them.  It is new firms that do the initial work of advancing computer 
design using microprocessors. The probability that an extant transistor firm will try to switch 
over is a function of two variables.  The first is how far along microprocessor computer 
designs have been pushed. The second is the closeness of a transistor firm to the technological 
possibility frontier defined by transistor technology.  The former clearly is a signal to extant 
firms that "there is a potentially powerful new technology out there, and we may be in trouble 
if we don't adopt it."  The latter is an indication that "we can't get much further if we keep on 
pushing along the same road." 
  
     If an old transistor firms decides to switch over, it faces one significant disadvantage, but 
also has an advantage.  The disadvantage is that the experience that got it to the forefront of 
transistor technology (recall Equation 1) counts for little or nothing if it shifts over to 
microprocessor technology.  Thus in its  first efforts in microprocessor computer design, it will 
achieve only about the average for extant microprocessor based mainframe firms.  Further, it 
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must incur a once and for all switchover cost in order to start designing, producing, and 
marketing microprocessor based mainframes.  However, extant transistor firms have the 
advantage of large R&D budgets which, with a cost, they can switch over to working with the 
new technology, and a stock of accumulated earnings on which they can draw to cover any 
transition costs.  
  
     In sum, adoption of the new technology takes place in two steps. First, a firm must 
“perceive” microprocessors technology. Perception is a stochastic process that depends on the 
current technological position of the potential adopter in relation to the technological frontier 
in transistors and on  the progress realized by the new technology: 
 
(9) Prperc  = [zig  + zmph / 2]λ 
 
where Pperc  is the probability of perceiving microprocessors technology,  zi  is fraction of the 
transistors technological frontier covered by firm i and  zmp is the fraction of the 
microprocessors frontier covered by the best-practice microprocessors firm. The parameter λ 
measures the general difficulty of perceiving the new technology. 
 
 Once firms have perceived the possibility of adoption, they have to invest in order to 
acquire the new technology. Adoption costs  (Cad) entail a fixed cost, Fad, equal for all firms, 
and the payment of a fraction q of firms’ accumulated budget, linked to factors like the 
training of engineers and the like.  Thus,  
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(10) Cad = Fad,  + q Bt
 
 Firms whose budget does not cover the fixed costs or whose profit rate is negative cannot 
adopt microprocessors. Moreover, the competence-destroying nature of the new technology is 
captured by the notion that adoption implies that the experience  accumulated on the old 
technology counts now much less.  In the model, experience (T) is reduced by a factor which 
is a parameter of the model. 
 
 Once firms have adopted the new technology, they have access to the new technological 
frontier and can innovate faster. However, they maintain their original trajectory. 
  
     Once an old transistor mainframe firm has switched over to microprocessor technology, it 
is potentially open to it  to diversify by designing  and trying to sell computers on the PC 
market. Diversification can take place only after the adoption of microprocessors.The 
incentive for diversification is a function of the size of the PC market, defined in terms of the 
number of computers sold, as compared to the mainframe market. Specifically, diversification 
becomes possible when the ratio between the size of the PC market and the size of the 
mainframe market is bigger than a threshold value, which is a parameter of the model.  
  
     The firms’ old design trajectory will, in general, not be a good one to pursue if it wants to 
diversify into PC's.  As noted, IBM diversified by setting up an entirely new division, and that 
is what we assume about diversification of mainframe producers into the PC market in this 
model.   
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     The parent company founds a new division trying to exploit the available competencies 
specific to PCs, rather than to apply its own competencies to the new market.  
  
     The new division inherits from the parent company a fraction of the budget, of technical 
capabilities and advertising capabilities. The size of these fractions are all parameters of the 
model. The position of the new division in the design space is determined as the average merit 
of design prevailing in the PC market at the time diversification occurs. In other words, the 
parent company exploits “public knowledge” in the PC market and partly “imitates”  PC 
firms. The technical progress trajectory ( i.e. the mix of engineers of the two types) is 
randomly re-calculated. After birth, the new division behaves exactly as a new entrant, with  
independent products and  profits and budget. 
 
  The new divisional firm faces the disadvantage that there already are firms selling in the 
PC market, with designs that already exceed thresholds,  positive market shares, established 
advertising budgets, and experience in the PC market.  However, the new divisional firm does 
have the advantage of being able to dip into the "deep pockets" and resources of its mother 
firm, which can switch over to PCs a sizeable fraction of its extant R and D  and advertising 
budgets.  After the initial infusion of resources, the new PC branch firm is on its own. 
 
 
4.   HISTORY REPLICATING AND HISTORY DIVERGENT SIMULATIONS 
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 This model is able to “replicate” the industry history, with a parameter setting that reflects 
the basic key assumptions that economists who have studied the computer industry suggested 
were behind the pattern that happened. We call this parameter setting the “standard set”. The 
details of the simulations are discussed in a previous paper and, for reasons of space,  we do 
not discuss them here again (Malerba-Nelson-Orsenigo-Winter, 1999). 
 
 A dominant transistor-based firm (IBM) emerged relatively quickly in the mainframe 
market.  That firm held on to its large share of the market, even when new microprocessor 
firms entered that market and challenged it.  Part of the reason the dominant firm held on is 
that it shifted over to microprocessor technology in a relatively timely manner.  That firm then 
entered the PC market, and gained a nontrivial, but not a dominant share.   
 
 The key factors that led to this pattern were assumed to be the following.  First, the early 
buyers of IBM equipment tended to feel themselves "locked in" to IBM for upgrades, 
extensions, and renewal of their computer capacity, largely because of specialized software.  
This made entry of new firms difficult.  In terms of our model, a firm that has a high market 
share in mainframes will, because of that, attract a significant share of new purchases.  
Second, by the time the new technology came along, computer design under the old 
technology was reasonably advanced, and the leader, IBM, responded to the availability of 
new technology pretty rapidly.  In terms of our model, soon after the first microprocessor 
firms enter the mainframe market, the dominant transistor firm in that market switches over to 
microprocessors.  Third, IBM's massive resources enabled it quickly to mount an R&D and 
advertising effort sufficient for it to catch up with the earlier entrants into the PC market.  
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However, because the PCs produced by a number of other companies were compatible with 
the software used by IBM PC's, there was no specific lock-in to IBM.  And within the class of 
IBM compatibles, customers were quite sensitive to the merit of the computers being offered, 
particularly to price.  In terms of our model, in the PC market the coefficient on quality was 
high, and the coefficient on specific market share was low. 
 
 After a "history friendly" replication base case had  been achieved, we modified the value 
of the parameters we identified as corresponding to the fundamental causal factors of the 
observed history, in order to see if those changes produced quite different patterns of 
evolution. Thus, we reduced the coefficient on market share in the demand equations for 
mainframes, to see if this would  damp down the tendency of a dominant firm to emerge, and 
hold on in the face of new stringent competition.  Second, firms using microprocessor 
technology entered the mainframe market earlier, before a dominant firm has emerged. Third, 
transistor firms were more sluggish in shifting over to microprocessors, and it was more costly 
for them to do so.  Fourth, demand in the PC market was more sensitive to advertising, and 
less sensitive to computer quality, so that a deep-pockets company diversifying into PC's from 
mainframes had a chance of quickly grabbing a large share of the PC market. Results of the 
simulations were consistent with our expectations. 
 
 Being satisfied that the structure and the parametrization of the model captures the basic 
logic behind the evolution of the computer industry, we are now confident to use this 
apparatus to carry on further experiments and counterfactuals to analyze the  problems and the 
effects of alternative policy interventions. 
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5.  COMPETITION AND INDUSTRIAL POLICIES IN DYNAMIC MARKETS: 
ANTITRUST, ENTRY SUPPORT AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
 
     In this paper two broad groups of  policies are going to be discussed: antitrust and entry 
support. Antitrust policies have the aim of reducing the high level of concentration in the 
market, while entry support policies have the objective to increase contestability and variety.       
We will examine them in their effects on market concentration,  price and technological 
change  Results refer to 100 runs. 
 
5.1. Antitrust policies 
 
     In our model antitrust authority (AA) intervenes when the monopolist reaches a share of 
75% of the market5.  It acts by breaking the monopolist in two.  The two new firms originating 
from the old monopolists have half of size and resources of the previous monopolist: budget, 
engineers, cumulated marketing expenditures (and thus also bandwagon effect). They 
maintain however the same position in terms of product attributes (cheapness and 
 
5 Given the feature of our model, the 75% share could be set higher or lower without changing 
the features of the intervention. In fact, the monopolist in few years reaches a share between 
85% and  90% of the mainframe market and does not falls below it in the course of the whole 
simulation. 
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performance), experience and technology  of the previous monopolist.6  The two new firms 
differ only in terms of trajectory: one of the two has the monopolist trajectory, the other a 
trajectory chosen at random.7
 
     We have tested a very rapid AA intervention or a very late one. In one case antitrust 
intervenes very soon, 1 year after the first firm has reached a share of  75% of the market. This 
is a very unrealistic run, because most of the time AA breaks the first entrant. But we have 
used it as an extreme case. In other cases AA intervention is not immediate (5 years),  late (10 
years) or  very late (20 years). 
 
     Results are shown in Table 1 for the Mainframe market, where the Herfindahl indexes for 
the various cases are compared. When AA intervenes extremely early, the market becomes 
concentrated again very soon, and remains so, albeit at a lower level than for the standard case.  
From the two firms resulting from antitrust intervention one will emerge again as a 
monopolist, because it will benefit from increasing returns and lock ins at the demand level. 
 
6 In a simulation, we have halved the monopolists in two but have maintained the overall 
endogenous bandwagon effect to one of the two new firms. Of course, the firm that have the 
bandwagon effect very rapidly regain a monopolistic position. This interesting result points to 
the fact that an antitrust intervention that aims just to break in two the R-D and the size of the 
monopolist, without paying attention to bandwagon effects in a market with high lock ins, is 
doomed to sure failure.     
7 In another set of simulations, we have created two new firms with exactly the same 
trajectory.  Results do not differ from the new random trajectory case.   
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     In the case of not immediate AA intervention (5 years), all the firms have already entered 
the market but they are still small in terms of size. The break up of the largest firm has the 
effect of making firms more similar in terms of size and resources, so that the emergence of a 
monopolist takes more time and the Herfindahl index reaches at the end of the simulation a 
medium to high level (between .6 and .7). On the contrary if the AA intervenes late (10years),  
the monopolist  has already reached a certain size and the two new firms resulting from the 
intervention are already rather large with respect to the other competitors: therefore, one of the 
two new large firms will gain the leadership and the market will tend toward concentration, 
with a final level of the Herfindahl index higher than in the previous case. Finally, if the 
intervention occurs too late (20 years) the market will be divided into two oligopolists, which 
will not profit any more from the possibility of gaining market leadership because increasing 
returns are limited (technological opportunities are almost all depleted).     
 
     These results show the relevance of  the timing of the intervention in dynamic markets. It 
makes a big difference whether AA intervenes too early or too late. In dynamic markets, it is 
important to consider whether all the potential players have already entered the market or not, 
firms are of small size or large size, and increasing returns have started to fade away.  In case 
AA intervenes too early and increasing returns are still quite high, after the intervention the 
few players in the market generate a situation quite similar to the initial one. On the contrary, 
if AA intervenes too late, with limited increasing returns, the market will remain divided 
between two large firms.  
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     Another interesting result of our model is the effect on the second market (PC) of an  
antitrust intervention in the first market (mainframes). As one can see from Table 2, as a 
consequence of the AA intervention in the first market, the level of concentration in the 
second market decreases. The reasons are basically two. When antitrust acts very early or 
early,  and large mainframe firms are able to regenerate their advantages, two mainframe firms 
instead of one diversify in the PC market: the market leader and a second firm that has gained 
some considerable market share. Thus the PC market will be shared by a greater number of 
large firms, both new microprocessor firms and mainframes firms, and concentration will 
decrease. In case antitrust acts too late, only one firm will diversify in the other market as in 
the standard case. Its size however will be very small and the overall level of concentration in 
the PC market will decrease. 
 
     The trends in performance and prices (not reported here) do not show significant 
differences over time between the standard case and the antitrust interventions. Here static 
efficiency considerations related to the breaking of the monopolist allow for lower prices (due 
to the lower mark-up). However static considerations are compensated by a more limited 
increase in cheapness (or moving down the learning curve) and in performance due to the 
smaller size and the reduced R-D budget.  
 
     Finally, we have tested the effects of antitrust when one of the two sources of increasing 
returns characterizing the mainframe segment - lock-ins at the demand level - is not present 
(Table 3). In order to do that we have put the exponent on market share equal to zero in the 
demand equation. In this case the Herfindahl index in mainframes decreases, although not 
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significantly, because of the working of the effects of increasing returns on the R-D side. 
Interestingly enough, antitrust effects are significant and show a similar pattern (although at a 
lower level) as the ones in Table 1, with one difference. Once broken, in most case 
concentration tends to remain at the same level and not to pick up again, as in the case with 
demand lock-ins.      
 
5.2.   Entry support 
 
     In our model the support for entry with the aim of increasing the degree of contestability 
and variety in the market is done in three broad ways. The first concerns the support for the 
exploration (pre-market) phase of existing firms; the second  the support of  small firms in the 
post entry phase; the third the increase in the number of firms in the market 
 
a.  Support  for the exploration by  firms 
 
     First,  government policy may support  exploration. In our runs, support is given first to all 
first generation  (transistors) firms (six in total) or only to firms with a small budget and later 
to all second generation (microprocessor) firms (twenty in total) or only to firms with a small 
budget. Total support is calculated in terms of share of the total initial budget of firms8. In this 
case 30% of the total initial budget of firms is divided among either all firms or the smaller 
ones. To each firm a share proportional to its budget is assigned. 
 
8 In a series of runs the government supports firms’ R-D expenditures instead of the  budget. 
Results  have not changed significantly.  
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     Results show that,  as far as concentration is concerned, no major difference with the 
standard case exist for the mainframe market (which remain highly concentrated). (see Table 
4, where only the support for the exploration of small firms is shown). For the second 
generation firms, exploration support increases the entry of microprocessor firms into the 
mainframe market (with no much effect on the concentration level in that market). However 
the greater number of  (microprocessor) mainframes firms now leads to a greater number of  
diversifiers into the PC market.  Thus the Herfindahl in PC market decreases because of that 
(Table 5). 
 
b.  Support for the post-entry survival of new small firms 
  
     An alternative policy may be related to the support of new firms that just entered the 
market and that may lack resources and capabilities. The government may support either all 
firms except the leader or only the small firms (in Tables 4 and 5 we have shown only this 
second case). Again,  30% of the total initial budget of firms is distributed among the entrants. 
The total support is again proportional to its size in terms of market share. The government 
gives half of the budget in the first quarter of the first year, then ¼ of  support in the first 
quarter of the second year and the last ¼ in the first quarter of the second year.  
 
     This type of policy is totally ineffective in mainframes: concentration does not decrease   
(see Table 4). The explanation is that in this case support is given to firms that were already in 
the market and losing. Given the strong increasing returns in the market, this is not enough  to 
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counterbalance the dominance of the leader.  In the PC market, concentration is again lower 
than in the standard case, because of the greater number of diversifying firms from the 
mainframe market.  
 
 
c. Support for the creation of new firms 
 
     Third, a set of policies may concern the support for the creation of totally new firms (in the 
form of public funding of new risky initiatives), in order to increase competition and the 
variety of approaches and trajectories. Here again the same amount of money (30% of  the 
total initial budget of  firms) is given to two firms, without the requirement to be given back to 
the venture capitalists as in the standard case.    
 
     As Table 4 shows, the creation of two new firms in mainframes decreases somewhat the 
concentration in the mainframe market.  The major effects however are on the PC market (see 
Table 5). The support to the two new microprocessor firms is a significant one: the initial 
budget of the 20 microprocessor firms is concentrated in two new large firms. Thus initially 
the  Herfindahl index in the PC market rises. It then decreases and goes to a level even lower 
than the standard one, when the greater number of diversifying mainframe firms enters the PC 
market. 
 
 
d. Alternative runs  on antitrust and entry support policies 
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      Given the unsatisfactory results of antitrust and entry support policies in terms of reducing 
concentration in the mainframe market,  other types of simulations have been run.  
 
      The first set of simulations  regards policies that aim to greatly increase the number of new 
entrants, in order to increase the variety of approaches.. Thus the simulation keeps  the same 
amount of support (30% of the total initial budget) but increases the number of firms created 
with that  support (4 or 6 transistor firms).   Results (not reported here) show no change in 
concentration from the standard case.  
 
      Also the coupling of the two policies (antitrust and entry support) is not more successful 
than the use of a single type of policy. In fact in a second set of simulations, we have tested an 
antitrust intervention coupled with the creation of new firms or the support of new entrants. 
Results (not reported here) do not show major differences with the cases discussed above.  
 
     In a third group of simulations we have envisaged an exceptionally big intervention, 
reaching 100% of the total initial budget of firms (instead of 30%). In one set of simulation 
runs we studied the effect of a support of the creation of only 6 new transistor firms. In a 
second set of runs,  support was given to 6 new transistor firms and 20 new microprocessor 
firms.  Results (Table 6 and 7) show some decrease in the Hefindahl index in Mainframes, and 
a considerable decrease in the Herfindahl index in PC. 
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    Finally, we have explored the role of  policy in an environment with less strong increasing  
returns. We have maintained increasing returns at the R-D level, but not at the demand level in 
the mainframe market, by setting the exponent of the market share in the demand equation 
equal to zero. As one could imagine, the standard simulation shows a lower level of 
concentration in the mainframe market. Then  we have analyzed the effects of the same type 
of policy interventions discussed above (support  of 30% of the total initial budget). Results in 
Tables 8 and 9 show some reductions in the concentration in mainframes and PC markets. 
These reductions are not considerable however.  Finally, we have introduced the strong type of 
intervention (support of 100% of the total initial budget for the creation of several new firms) 
just discussed above. In this case, the runs regarding  the policy interventions  show a much 
lower level of concentration  (see Tables 6 and 7). In addition, policies in the mainframe 
market  are more effective in decreasing the level of concentration than in the standard case of 
strong increasing returns.  While significantly diminished however, concentration does not go 
below 0.4, even in the case of 6 new transistor firms and 20 microprocessor firms. 
 
5.3.   Public procurement of   new products  
 
The government may act also as a customer who likes experimenting new 
technologies in established markets and therefore likes buying those products that incorporate 
the new technology.  The government may buy totally new products not deterred from that 
experimentation simply because the quality of the new products is not up to that which they 
had been buying.  
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In our simulations, the government buys the new microprocessor based mainframes 
and acts as a large group  of customers (30% of the market) who likes experimenting and buy 
products with the new technology. In this case the new microprocessor technology takes off 
rapidly, both in terms of new firms producing mainframes with the new technology and of 
established firms eventually adopting the new technology. But the new firms with the new 
technology are also able to take a dominant position in the market, and  concentration in the 
mainframe market is significantly reduced. (see Table 6) 
 
 
6.    CONCLUSIONS 
 
      The results of the simulations suggest some rather “provocative” conclusions. First, in 
strongly cumulative markets, where there are strong dynamic increasing returns, there is 
obviously a strong tendency towards concentration and some sort of “natural monopoly”.   
Our main result is that it is extremely difficult to contrast this tendency. In most of our 
simulations, policy interventions are ineffective in significantly modifying the degree of 
concentration. Only very big and focused  interventions have a chance to be effective. Even 
when one source of increasing returns is taken away, concentration and a market leader 
emerge and policy intervention, albeit more successful than in the other case, is not able to 
break down the dominant firm and to significantly reduce concentration.  Only policies of 
public procurement in which the government plays the role of experimental user constitutes a 
fundamental mechanism allowing the growth and survival of new firms with new promising 
technologies that would have otherwise faced difficult time in a different context. 
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    Second, the reason of this “policy ineffectiveness” of antitrust and entry support policies  
lies in the strongly cumulative nature of the market. Small initial advantages tend to grow 
bigger over time and catching up is almost impossible. Leaders do not only have a “static” 
advantage: they run faster than laggards. Thus, policies of the kind of antitrust and entry 
support are somehow designed to “leveling the playing field”. But this is not sufficient. In 
order to get results, some form of “positive discrimination” may be necessary . That is to say, 
policies should make competitors able to run (much) faster than the monopolist, and not just  
remove static disadvantages. This is what public procurement in favour of highly innovative 
products (thus having a high potential for improvement with respect to existing products) 
does. 
 
    Third, our simulations suggest that there is actually almost no difference in terms of 
technological progress and prices between more concentrated and more competitive situations. 
In our model, the classical Schumpeterian trade-off  does not practically exist. In terms of our 
(admittedly extremely rough) measures of “welfare”, there are no specific reasons to favor 
monopoly or competition.  This does not necessarily imply that monopoly should not be 
contrasted. If anything, the implication might be the opposite. We should not be too worried to 
contrast monopoly on the basis of the “Schumpeterian trade-off”. 
 
     This is even more the case, if competition had additional virtues. For example, one might 
dislike monopoly on grounds different from purely “efficiency” consideration , but simply on 
more political bases: large concentrations of power are not   desirable in a democratic society.   
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Closer to the nature of this paper – and obviously in an evolutionary perspective - one of the 
main virtues of competition is likely to reside in its ability to generate novelty, e.g. entirely 
new products or processes or major technological discontinuities. In its present form, our 
model captures it through the role played by public procurement targeted to  products 
embodying a totally new technology and supplied by firms that enter the mainframe market on 
the basis of the technological discontinuity  associated to the appearance of microprocessors.  
In this case public policy is able to affect market structure and significantly decrease 
concentration. 
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